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Abstract
Coalitions are usually defined with respect to a static
framework of dependencies among agents. In this paper
we propose a dynamic view of dependence networks to en-
able dynamic coalitions which can self adapt to a situation
by exploiting the possibility to trigger other agents’ goals.
Social viewpoints become more popular in multiagent
systems (MAS), since the representation of MAS as, for
example, social networks, dependence networks, organiza-
tions, or normative systems, focusses on the interactions
among the agents and facilitates the development of interac-
tion mechanisms, agreement technologies or adaptive orga-
nizations. We [1] provide a semi-formal definition of social
viewpoints on MAS, and relate views of these viewpoints to
each other using abstraction and refinement relations. For
example, a detailed BDI model can be abstracted to a de-
pendence network as used in Tropos [4] where they show
how to use these formal representations to define criteria
for coalition formation [2], or measures for MAS inspired
by social network analysis (SNA) [3]. However, they con-
sider only absolute goals and static dependence networks.
This prevents modelling more adaptive situations, where for
example a coalition dynamically self adapts to a situation: a
member of the coalition triggers a goal of another agent to
make it dependent on the coalition so that the agent has an
advantage in entering the coalition and give its contribution
in turn.
In this paper we therefore address the following three
problems to introduce self adaptability in our work on social
viewpoints on MAS: How to define a dynamic dependence
network for agents with conditional goals? Which kind of
powers can be distinguished in a dynamic dependence net-
work? How to define self adaptive coalitions for dynamic
dependence networks?
Like in our previous work [1], we use the simplest repre-
sentation possible to relate the views. For example, we do
not consider actions, tasks, planning, or resources.
In planning, goals are given. Therefore, many models
define the goals of a set of agents A by a function goals :
A→ 2G, where G is the complete set of goals. However,
in many agent programming languages and architectures,
goals are conditional and can be generated. We therefore
extend the mind view of [1] with conditional goals.
Definition 1 (Mind view) is represented by the tuple
〈A,G,X ,goals : A×2X → 2G,skills : A→ 2X ,R : 2X → 2G〉
where A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals, X is a set of
decisions and R is a set of rules.
Example 1 (See Figure) A = {a1,a2,a3,a4,a5} and
G = {g1,g2,g3,g4} and X = {x1,x2,x3,x4,x5};
goals(a1, /0) = {g1}, goals(a3, /0) = {g2},
goals(a5,{x1,x3}) = {g3}, goals(a5,{x5}) = {g3},
goals(a2,{x1}) = {g4};
skills(a1) = {x1}, skills(a2) = {x2}, skills(a3) = {x1,x3},
skills(a4) = {x5}, skills(a5) = {x4};
R({x4})={g1,g2}, R({x2})={g3}, R({x1,x3})={g4};
With conditional goals, two kinds of powers can be dis-
tinguished: to trigger a goal, and to fulfill it.
Definition 2 (Power view) is represented by the tuple
〈A,G, power−goals : 2A→ 2(A×G), power : 2A→ 2G〉
A set of agents B has the power to see to it that agent a
has the goal g, written as (a,g) ∈ power−goals(B), if and
only if there are a set of decisions of B such that g becomes
a goal of a. A set of agents B has the power to see to goal g
if and only if there are a set of decisions of B such that g is
a consequence of it.
Definition 3 〈A,G, power-goals, power〉 is an abstraction
from 〈A,G,X ,goals,skills,R〉 if and only if:
• (a,g) ∈ power-goals(B) if and only if goals(B) =
∪{skills(b) | b ∈ B} such that g ∈ goals(a,Y ), and
• g ∈ power(B) if and only if ∃Y ⊆ skills(B) such that
g ∈ R(Y ).
Example 2 A and G; power-goals( /0) =
{(a1,g1),(a3,g2)}, power-goals({a3}) = {(a5,g3)},
power-goals({a4}) = {(a5,g3)}, power-goals({a1}) =
{(a2,g4)}; power({a5}) = {g1,g2}, power({a3}) = {g4},
power({a2}) = {g3};
Due to the power to create goals, dependence relations
are no longer static but can be created by the agents. We
therefore have to extend the dependence networks devel-
oped by Conte and Sichman [6] to dynamic ones as in [5].
Definition 4 (Dynamic dependence view) A dynamic de-
pendence network (DDN) is a tuple 〈A,G,dyndep〉 where A
and G are as before, and dyndep : A× 2A× 2A → 22G is a
function that relates with each triple of a agent and two sets
of agents all the sets of goals on which the first depends on
the second, if the third creates the dependency.
Abstracting power view to a dynamic dependence net-
work can be done as below. Here, the creation of a dynamic
dependency is based only on the power to create goals. In
other models, creating a dependency can also be due to cre-
ation of new skills of an agent.
Definition 5 〈A,G,dyndep〉 is an abstraction
of 〈A,G, power-goals, power〉, if we have H ∈
dyndep(a,B,C) iff 1) ∀g ∈ H : (a,g) ∈ power-goals(C),
and 2) H ⊆ power(B).
Example 3 A and G; dyndep(a1,{a5}, /0) = {{g1}},
dyndep(a3,{a5}, /0) = {{g2}},dyndep(a2,{a3},{a1}) =
{{g4}}, dyndep(a5,{a2},{a3}) = {{g3}},
dyndep(a5,{a2},{a4}) = {{g3}};
We combine these two abstractions, abstracting mind
view to a dynamic dependence network as follows.
Proposition 1 〈A,G,dyndep〉 is an abstraction of
〈A,G,X ,goals,skills,R〉, if we have H ∈ dyndep(a,B,C)
iff 1) ∃Y ⊆ skills(C) such that H ⊆ goals(a,Y ), and 2)
∃Y ⊆ skills(B) such that H ⊆ R(Y )
Finally, we define reciprocity based coalitions for dy-
namic dependence networks. Like in [1], we represent
the coalition not only by a set of agents, as in game the-
ory, but as a set of agents together with a partial dynamic
dependence relation. Intuitively, the dynamic dependence
relation represents the “contract” of the coalition: if H ∈
dyndep(a,B,D), then the set of agents D is committed to
create the dependency, and the set of agents B is commit-
ted to see to the goals H of agent a. The rationality con-
straints on reciprocity based coalitions are that each agent
contributes something, and receives something back.
Definition 6 (Reciprocity based Coalition) Given a dy-
namic dependence network 〈A,G,dyndep〉, a reciprocity
based coalition is represented by coalition C ⊆ A together
with dynamic dependencies dyndep′ ⊆ dyndep, such that
• if ∃b,B,D,H with H ∈ dyndep′(a,B,D) then a ∈ C,
B⊆C and D⊆C (the domain of dyndep′ contains only
agents in coalition C), and
• for each agent a ∈ C we have ∃b,B,D,H with H ∈
dyndep′(b,B,D) such that a ∈ B ∪D (agent a con-
tributes either creating a dependency or fulfilling a
goal), and
• for each agent a ∈ C ∃B,D,H with H ∈
dyndep′(a,B,D) (agent a receives something from C).
Example 4 Coalition C = {a1,a2,a3,a5}. Agent a4 is ex-
cluded from C because it has a power-goal (the same as a3)
but he does not depend on any agent in C.
Summarizing, we define dynamic dependence networks
by making the dependence relation conditional to the agents
that have the power to create the relation. We distinguish
two kinds of power, not only to fulfill goals as in static net-
works but also the power to create dependencies. Coalitions
are defined by “contracts” in which each agent both con-
tributes to and profit from it: the coalition can self adapt to
the situation by exploiting - via goal triggering - the dynam-
ics of DNs to exploit opportunities which are not currently
present. Further researches are the use of our new theory
for coalition formation, e.g., when two agents can make the
other depend on itself and thus create a potential coalition?
Do these new ways to create coalitions make the system
more efficient? Moreover, new measures have to be defined
for DDNs, finding inspiration in dynamic SNA.
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